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Recent examinations of public education have found a disturbing
decline in academic standards and student achievement. Many stu-
dents are graduating without adequate knowledge and skills to par-
ticipate fully in our culture and economy, and critics fear that the
decline in education has jeopardized our national stature."' These
criticisms have generated calls for increased funding of schools and
strengthened supervision and accountability of school districts,
schools, and teachers. Such calls for accountability have commonly
focused on strengthening hierarchical control in public education-
mandating core curricula for all schools and evaluating and funding
schools on the basis of students' achievements and performance on
standardized examinations.
2
At the same time, other reformers have challenged the established
structure of authority in public education. They argue that local
school boards, district administrators, and state and federal educa-
tion agencies-hierarchical authorities in education-exercise lim-
ited influence over schools' provision of education. Principals and
teachers possess considerable discretion because of our conceptions
of good teaching and the practical restrictions on organizational
control in schools. Principals and teachers in schools exert the
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1. See, e.g., E. Boyer, High School: A Report on Secondary Education in America
(1983); Nat'l Comm'n on Excellence in Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ., A Nation At Risk:
The Imperative for Educational Reform (1983).
2. See generally Bennett, Accountability in Our Schools, 108 Educ. 127 (1987)"
Benveniste, The Design of School Accountability Systems, 7 Educ. Evaluation & Pol'y
Analysis 261 (1985); Dill, Toward a System of Educational Quality Control: National
Achievement Tests and the "Theory of Screening," in Policies for America's Public
Schools: Teachers, Equity and Indicators 240 (R. Haskins & D. Macrae eds. 1988);
Stern, Toward a Statewide System for Public School Accountability: A Report from Cali-
fornia, 18 Educ. & Urb. Soc'y 326 (1986).
3. On the conception of teaching, see R. Glaser, Adaptive Education: Individual Di-
versity and Learning (1977);J. Goodlad, School, Curriculum, and the Individual, at ch. I
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most influence over the quality of education, yet the structure of
public education largely insulates them from accountability. They
often lack the incentives and resources to provide effective school-
ing, while school boards and administrators lack the power to moti-
vate or replace poor principals and teachers. Indeed, hierarchical
efforts to improve schooling often interfere with school leadership
and good teaching practices.
4
These reformers advocate strengthening school officials' account-
ability to individual parents rather than reinforcing hierarchical ac-
countability. For instance, if parents had a greater choice of
schools, decisions about whether a child should attend or leave a
school would promote accountability in the same way customers'
demands guide companies' decisions about products and prices. Al-
ternatively, if parents could help plan their children's education,
they could challenge officials' decisions about their children and
thus prompt officials to consider carefully each child's schooling. If
either of these forms of parental accountability were established,
parents could monitor their children's education. Dissatisfied par-
ents could remove their children from the school or challenge
schools' decisions. Moreover, accountability in individual cases
would result in a system of accountability. The prospect of losing stu-
dents or parental challenges would provide school officials strong
incentives to improve or maintain quality. Freed of some of the hi-
erarchical restrictions on schools, principals and teachers would
have both the power and the responsibility to develop effective
schools. 5
Hierarchical and parental accountability are based on competing
orientations toward school officials' decisions and actions in individ-
ual cases. One approach, the collective welfare orientation, focuses pri-
marily on the achievement of collective ends. In this orientation,
concern for hierarchical accountability focuses on how well aggregate
outcomes meet collective goals or, when goals are difficult to mea-
sure, how well actions in particular cases follow the bureaucratic
standards and procedures promulgated by state education officials
(1966). On the loosely coupled nature of educational organizations, see Weick, Educa-
tional Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 Admin. Sci. Q 1 (1976); Elmore,
Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation, 26 Pub. Pol'y 185 (1978).
4. Chubb & Moe, Politics, Markets, and the Organization of Schools. 82 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 1065 (1988); West, The Public Monopoly and the Seeds of Self-Destruction, in
Family Choice in Schooling 185 (M. Manley-Casimir ed. 1982).
5. Chubb & Moe, supra note 4;J. Coons & S. Sugarman, Education by Choice (1978);
Sexton, Evolution by Choice, in Black Papers: A Fight for Education 86 (C. Cox & B.
Dyson eds. 1975).
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and local school boards. A competing approach, the individual client
orientation, directs case-level decision making toward serving the in-
terests of each individual client. In this orientation, concern for pa-
rental accountability focuses on parental participation in decision
making and how well each decision meets the needs of the child.
These two forms of accountability conflict in important ways, so
that strengthening parental accountability restricts the role of hier-
archical accountability and the collective welfare orientation in
schools. In this Article, I examine two efforts to strengthen parental
accountability in public education-parental rights of participation
and challenge in special education in the United States, and parental
rights of school choice in the United Kingdom. Parental rights can
enable individual parents to hold schools accountable for the educa-
tion their children receive. Yet few parents possess the assertive-
ness and knowledge to act. Because so few parents take action, no
general system of accountability develops. As a result, only children
whose parents exercise their rights benefit; others, whose parents
remain silent, may be harmed by the diversion of resources to more
popular schools to provide special services for individual children in
response to assertive parents' demands.
In short, efforts to strengthen parental accountability in schools
have not resulted in better schools and have exacerbated problems
of inequity in many public schools. Although a parent should be
able to question school officials' actions and, in some circumstances,
move her child to a school she believes would be better, parental
accountability must also be considered in the context of schools'
collective welfare orientation. The schools' responsibility to pro-
vide equal educational opportunity to all their students limits paren-
tal rights.
L Accountability in Case-Level Decision Making
Notions of accountability in schools rest on particular orientations
toward decision making in individual cases. On the one hand, hier-
archical accountability focuses on school officials' accomplishment
of collective goals and their adherence to standards and procedures
set out by policy makers. Parental accountability, on the other hand,
focuses on decisions and actions responsive to parents' circum-
stances and choices. In the next two sections, I outline the collec-
tive welfare and the individual client orientations toward decision





A. The Collective Welfare Orientation and Hierarchical Accountability
Schools serve a variety of public purposes, including providing
children with knowledge and skills, training a productive workforce,
socializing children in the civic virtues of participation and obedi-
ence, and fostering racial harmony and social mobility. An empha-
sis on public purposes underlies the collective welfare orientation
toward decisions and actions in individual cases. This orientation
incorporates four principles. 6
First, school systems direct their efforts toward achieving collec-
tive ends-socially defined goals for the schools. School systems'
collective ends are determined in a complex and continuing process
involving a variety of actors: state and federal legislators, governors,
state education officers, school boards, school-level officials, teach-
ers, courts, parents, and students. Strong disagreements about pri-
orities and goals often arise both inside and outside schools.
7
Second, school systems aim for the pattern of outcomes that con-
tributes most satisfactorily to their collective goals. Success or fail-
ure in individual cases is less important. For instance, many of the
recent efforts to reform schools focus on students' scores on stan-
dardized achievement tests. Officials examine the overall distribu-
tion of scores and their relation to other schools' scores, not
whether a particular child performed adequately or up to her
abilities."
Third, school systems are subject to a complex structure of au-
thority.!' Policy makers and higher-level administrators, particularly
6. The description of the collective welfare orientation presented here focuses on
schooling. It is based on an orientation developed to address case-level decision making
in a wide variety of social programs, such as welfare, education, health care, and hous-
ing. See Tweedie, Discretion to Use Rules: Individual Interests and Collective Welfare
in School Admissions, II L. & Pol'y 189 (1989). Substantial research, led by Michael
Lipsky, has focused on the structural similarities of case-level decision making in social
programs. Basing the understanding of decision making and accountability in education
broadly leads to a focus on the structural elements of education policy and decision
making. See M. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980); E. Brodkin, The False Promise
of Administrative Reform (1986); P. Foster, Access to Welfare (1983);J. Prottas, People-
Processing (1979); R. Weatherley, Reforming Special Education: Policy Implementation
from State Level to Street Level (1979).
7. On education governance, see R. Campbell, L. Cunningham, R. Nystrand & M.
Usdan, The Organization and Control of American Schools (4th ed. 1980) [hereinafter
R. Campbell]; Peterson, The Politics of American Education, in 2 Review of Research in
Education 348 (F. Kerlinger &J. Carroll eds. 1974); D. Tyack, The One Best System
(1974); F. Wirt & M. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (1972).
8. See, e.g., Benveniste, supra note 2; Stern, supra note 2.
9. R. Campbell, supra note 7; Hanson, Organizational Control in Educational Sys-
tems: A Case Study of Governance in Schools, in Organizational Behavior in Schools
and School Districts 245 (S. Bacharach ed. 1981); Weick, supra note 3.
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those distant from the school site, cannot directly supervise or con-
trol decisions made at schools. They attempt to do so by mandating
procedures and schedules as well as standards to be applied in de-
ciding individual cases. They also use budget controls and aggre-
gate measures of outcomes to oversee schools.' 0
Fourth, school systems often must balance various goals. Re-
source constraints and conflicts among ends require officials at all
levels of authority to establish priorities and make tradeoffs.1'
In the collective welfare orientation, political and administrative
leaders hold school-level officials accountable for achieving goals
and adhering to mandated standards and procedures. State legisla-
tures and local school boards can hold schools politically accounta-
ble. Both approaches involve hierarchical accountability-the links
between democratically and administratively determined policy and
actions at schools. This chain of accountability traditionally is
viewed as a set of personalized links from the highest officials, legis-
lators and the chief executive, through each layer of bureaucracy,
down to principals and teachers. Each official is supposed to be
held accountable for her actions by superiors and, in turn, is sup-
posed to hold subordinates accountable. The nature of authority in
schools and the difficulty bureaucrats have in specifying educational
outcomes often result in a focus on compliance with minimum aca-
demic standards and reporting requirements. '
2
B. The Individual Client Orientation and Parental Accountability
In the individual client orientation, case-level decision making is
responsive to the specific circumstances of each student. Decisions
about the education provided to each student are based on individ-
ual judgments about that student's needs and interests. Either par-
ents or educators can be responsible for those decisions.'13 In this
10. See, e.g., Barro, Federal Education Goals and Policy Instruments: An Assessment
of the "Strings" Attached to Categorical Grants in Education, in The Federal Interest in
Financing Schooling 229 (NI. Timpane ed. 1981); F. Wirt & M. Kirst, Political and Social
Foundations of Education 112-22 (2d ed. 1975); A. Wise, Legislated Learning: The
Bureaucratization of the American Classroom (1979).
11. J. Goodlad, A Place Called School (1983); A. Gutmann, Democratic Education
19-70 (1987); M. Metz, Classrooms and Corridors (1978); Peterson & Williams, Models
of Decision Making, in State, School, and Politics 149 (M. Kirst ed. 1972).
12. Benveniste, supra note 2, at 265-66; LeMahieu, The Effects on Achievement and
Instructional Content of a Program of Student Monitoring through Frequent Testing, 6
Educ. Evaluation & Pol'y Analysis 175 (1984).
13. The individual client orientation is rooted in two different sets of ideals: parental
responsibility for children and teachers' professional knowledge and expertise. Both sets
of ideals reject the domination of the program-wide, collective orientation. Both share a




paper, I focus on parental responsibility as it provides the basis for
parental rights and accountability. Meeting the needs of students,
defined by their parents, replaces the pursuit of collective ends as
the focus of decision making. The individual client orientation rests
on four principles.
14
First, decisions in individual cases focus on the student involved.
Parental wishes, the circumstances of each student, and the pro-
grams or services available at the school define the limits of possible
choices. Decision making seeks to identify the needs and abilities of
the student and to tailor educational services accordingly.' 5 Many
factors are excluded from consideration, such as the circumstances
and needs of other students, the structure of courses and services
already offered by the school, the demand for those services, and
the limits on the school's resources.
Second, the orientation recognizes that parents are primarily re-
sponsible for their children's education.'" This principle of respect
for parental responsibility means that parents should be able to par-
ticipate in decisions about their child's education, that their wishes
should be respected when possible, particularly in choice of school
and design of educational programs, 17 and that parents should be
able to challenge officials' decisions to an impartial decision
maker. 18
of individual decisions rather than program policies. The key difference involves their
conflicting emphases on parental control and teachers' autonomy.
14. Like the collective welfare orientation, this description of the individual client
orientation is based on a broader model developed to apply to social programs gener-
ally. See Tweedie, supra note 6; Simon, The Invention and Re-invention of Welfare
Rights, 44 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1984). The individual client orientation, as it applies to
schooling, relies on the ethic of adapting teaching to the particular needs and abilities of
each child. See, e.g., R. Glaser, supra note 3; D. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner 329-36
(1986).
15. Tailoring the student's educational program to her needs and abilities is espe-
cially prominent in special education. See S. Kirk &J. Gallagher, Educating Exceptional
Children, at ch. 2 (3d ed. 1979); Walberg & Wang, Effective Education Practices and
Provisions for Individual Differences, in Handbook of Special Education: Research and
Practice 113 (M. Wang, M. Reynolds & H. Walberg eds. 1987). Gartner and Lipsky
argue that the individualized focus of special education should be extended to all stu-
dents. Gartner & Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a Quality System for All
Students, 57 Harv. Educ. Rev. 367, 388 (1987).
16. This principle is dominant in the parental responsibility version of the individual
client orientation, but would be subordinated to the professional judgment of teachers
and other educators in the professional expertise version. See, e.g., R. Glaser, supra note
3, at 83-88.
17. J. Coons & S. Sugarman, supra note 5; M. Friedman & R. Friedman, Free to
Choose 140-78 (1980); Murname, Family Choice in Public Education: The Roles of Stu-
dents, Teachers, and System Designers, 88 Tchrs. C. Rec. 169 (1986).
18. These principles of participation are based on the idea of education as a prop-
erty right. See Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
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Third, the focus on individual cases and the responsiveness to pa-
rental involvement require flexible approaches in individual cases.
Decisions in such cases therefore are not subject to predetermined
rules and procedures that would restrict arbitrarily parental wishes
and school officials' judgments. Officials draw upon a variety of re-
sponses to tailor a program to parental wishes and student needs. I'
Finally, response to the wishes of parents and needs of students
comes before policy making. Decisions in individual cases are not
determined by applying the school's policies. Focus on the individ-
ual case, respect for parental responsibility, and case-level flexibility
combine to preclude explicit tradeoffs in the school's case-level de-
cision making.20 The student's needs and the parents' choices de-
termine what the school provides.
2'
Accountability in the individual client orientation differs greatly
from hierarchical accountability. Rather than being accountable to
higher level policy makers, school-level officials are directly account-
able to parents for decisions and actions that involve their children.
The exact nature of the accountability depends on the rights parents
possess and the consequences of those rights for the school.
With parental accountability, school officials are held accountable
for satisfying parents' demands rather than for achieving public pur-
poses. What is important to individual sets of parents determines
what is important to school officials. In systems in which school en-
rollment influences budgets and staff, schools have incentives to re-
spond to parents' educational preferences, much as business firms
(or private schools) must attend to prospective customers' prefer-
ences. The right to exit can create markets in education. Schools
are held accountable in the same way that the local supermarket is
held accountable: attract a sufficient number of customers (parents)
and prosper; fail to do so and close.
22
19. See, e.g., Bickel, Classifying Mentally Retarded Students: A Review of Placement
Practices in Special Education, in Placing Children in Special Education: A Strategy for
Equity 182 (K. Heller, W. Holtzman & S. Messick eds. 1982); S. Kirk &J. Gallagher,
supra note 15; D. Schon, supra note 14.
20. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational Decisionmaking for the Handicapped
Child, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 (1985).
21. The individual client orientation does not, of course, magically resolve the prob-
lem of limited resources. It only excludes such considerations from case-level decision-
making and does not confront explicitly the problem that the sum of individual decisions
is likely to overwhelm the whole of the program. In practice, school officials cope with
limited resources through informal techniques of rationing. See P. Foster, supra note 6,
at 90-102; M. Lipsky, supra note 6, at 81-104; R. Weatherley, supra note 6.
22. For discussions of the logic of markets in education, see Chubb & Moe, supa note




Parental accountability does not work exclusively through market-
like mechanisms. Parents also can hold school officials accountable
by participating in decisions that affect their children or by using
their rights to challenge decisions and actions that do not follow
established standards, as they do in special education in the United
States. Accountability is still centered on satisfying parents about
their children's education, but parents must first be dissatisfied
enough to challenge school officials. And, as with market accounta-
bility, the system of accountability depends on the pattern of actions
of an individual parent holding (or not holding) officials
accountable.23
Parental accountability and hierarchical accountability conflict in
important ways, as do their underlying orientations toward case-
level decision making. I have developed them here as ideal types
but, in reality, schools are often simultaneously held responsible for
meeting the needs of individual children and serving collective
ends, despite inadequate resources that require tradeoffs. The con-
flict between these two orientations is seldom worked out explicitly.
Because of the conflict, neither of the two orientations is wholly re-
alized, and the different notions of accountability remain in
tension.24
I. Parental Rights and Accountability in Education: Special Education
and Choice of School
This section will examine the effect of parental rights and ac-
countability in two policy areas-special education in the United
States and choice of schools in the United Kingdom.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 197525 gave
American parents of handicapped children the right to participate in
decisions about their children's education and the right to challenge
ultimate decisions at formal hearings. The Education Act 198026
and the Education (Scotland) Act 198127 gave parents in the United
23. For discussions of the logic of hearing rights as controls on case-level decision
making in special education, see Abeson, Bolick & Haas, Due Process of Law: Back-
ground and Intent, in Public Policy and the Education of Exceptional Children 22 (F.
Weintraub, A. Abeson, J. Ballard & M. LaVor eds. 1976) [hereinafter Abeson]; Kirp,
Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural
Proposals, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1974).
24. See D. Schon, supra note 14, at 329-36; Scott, Professionals in Bureaucracy-Ar-
eas of Conflict, in Professionalization: Readings in Occupational Change 265 (H. Voll-
mer & D. Mills eds. 1966).
25. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982).
26. Education Act 1980, ch. 20, §§ 6-7.
27. Education (Scotland) Act 1981, ch. 58, §§ 28A-28F.
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Kingdom the right to request admission of their children to the
school of their choice, required school district authorities to grant
those requests absent statutory grounds of refusal, and enabled par-
ents to appeal refusals of admission to a particular school. These
two systems, emphasizing parental rights, illustrate the operation of
parental accountability in education. They demonstrate how asser-
tive and knowledgeable parents can use rights to improve the educa-
tion of their children. But conflicts among parental concerns,
limited school resources, and competing collective ends raise diffi-
cult questions about the system-wide benefits of parental
accountability.
A. Parental Rights in Special Education in the United States
A long campaign by advocates for rights for handicapped chil-
dren, seeking to overcome the entrenched resistance of most school
districts to special education, resulted in the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA). The Act established
the right of special-needs children to "free appropriate public edu-
cation" and also gave parents of such children the right to partici-
pate in and to challenge decisions made about their children's
education.28 Reformers sought to end the exclusion of handicapped
children from public education. Under the new law, school officials
and parents were to cooperate in designing an "individualized edu-
cation plan" (IEP) tailored to the needs and abilities of each child.
When possible, handicapped children were to be educated in regu-
lar classrooms. Reformers hoped that parental participation, in-
cluding the right to appeal, would make special education more
accountable to the needs of the children and the wishes of their
parents 29
28. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982) (codifying Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) and
subsequent amendments). In Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the phrase "free appropriate public education" in EAHCA
required only that schools offer handicapped children individually tailored instruction
and support services that enable them to benefit from education. See also Irving Indep.
School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984) (schools required to provide catheterization
for child with spina bifida despite expense); Burlington School Comm. v. Department of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (public school must pay expenses at private school if that is
determined to be the appropriate placement).
29. Abeson, supra note 23; Note, Enforcing the Right to an 'Appropriate' Education:
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1103 (1979);
Neal & Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of Special Education,
48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 (1985); Tweedie, The Politics of Legalization in Special
Education Reform, in Special Education Policies: Their History, Implementation, and




Before passage of the Act, most school districts considered special
education a marginal function, allotting it limited resources or sup-
port from administrators and other school personnel. Many handi-
capped children were excluded altogether from public school, while
the special education classes that did exist were usually separated
from the rest of the school. Regular classroom teachers often used
special education as a dumping ground for disruptive children. De-
spite the variety of children in these programs, special education de-
partments usually focused only on a few of the most common
handicapping conditions, such as mental retardation and learning
disabilities. They relied on simple diagnostic frameworks to assign
most handicapped children to the available programs, but often se-
lected a few children for focused consideration and special
treatment.11
The EAHCA has produced significant change. First, it authorized
a substantial increase in federal funding for special education
(although appropriations only reached a fraction of the amount au-
thorized) and led to more spending by state and local govern-
ments. 3 1 Second, it encouraged schools to bring in all handicapped
children who had been excluded from public education.3 2 Third, it
has enabled some parents to increase their participation and influ-
ence over decisions concerning their children's education. Many
parents have used their rights to obtain special services for their
children. Some parents have been able to secure private school
placement for their handicapped children at public expense.33
Despite these advances, the effects of increased parental rights in
special education have been limited. Individual parents have held
school officials accountable for decisions affecting their children,
but no general system of accountability has developed. Moreover,
limited resources continue to restrict the variety of programs that
schools can offer and prevent decision makers from focusing on the
needs and abilities of each child. To cope with the volume of cases,
30. Abeson & Ballard, State and Federal Policy for Exceptional Children, in Public
Policy and the Education of Exceptional Children 83 (F. Weintraub, A. Abeson & J.
Ballard eds. 1976); C. Milofsky, Special Education: A Sociological Study of California
Programs (1976); R. Weatherley, supra note 6.
31. J. Kakalik, W. Furry, M. Thomas & M. Carney, The Cost of Special Education
(1981), cited in Singer & Butler, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act:
Schools as Agents of Social Reform, 57 Harv. Educ. Rev. 125, 129 (1987); Clune & Van
Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analysis, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 18-19
(1985).
32. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31, at 15-16; Singer & Butler, supra note 31, at 132.
33. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31, at 31; Singer & Butler, supra note 31, at 14 1-44.
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school officials and special educators often have been forced to
adopt routine assessment and placement practices. Thus, many
handicapped students have been evaluated according to a list of
standard criteria, then sorted into an existing category and provided
the educational program assigned for that category. In addition,
few handicapped children have been moved out of special classes
and into the mainstream.
3 4
Although new parental rights have helped win benefits for handi-
capped children, these rights have not turned schools away from
their collective welfare orientation. While school districts have al-
tered their procedures to comply at least formally with the IEP re-
quirements established in the legislation, parents have been unable
to challenge the balance of power in educational planning. School
officials have retained primary influence over special education
planning. Furthermore, educators facing limited resources have cir-
cumvented formal individualized procedures and instead have used
standardized diagnostic methods.
35
When parents have participated assertively in the decision making
process, they have exercised a meaningful check on school officials'
discretion in individual cases. Parental participation in IEP meet-
ings, however, has been limited. While many parents attended
these meetings shortly after the act was implemented, participation
soon faded, allowing professional educators to reassert control.
Even when parents have attended IEP meetings, school officials
have limited their involvement. Key decisions often have been
made in closed conferences before parents have a chance to partici-
pate at meetings. Officials have then used the IEP meetings to gain
parents' consent to the program they have already selected.
School officials usually have resisted proposals that required new
or expensive services. Administrators and teachers have used
jargon and invoked professional expertise to intimidate and befud-
dle parents."' When parents have had the confidence to persist,
34. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31; Gartner & Lipsky, supra note 15; E. Hargrove, S.
Graham, L. Ward, V. Abernethy, J. Cunningham & W. Vaughn, Regulations and
Schools: The Implementation of Equal Education for Handicapped Children (1981)
[hereinafter E. Hargrove]; Ysseldyke, Algozzine & Epps, A Logical and Empirical Analy-
sis of Current Practice in Classifying Students as Handicapped, 50 Exceptional Children
160 (1983).
35. Bickel, supra note 19; Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31; E. Hargrove, supra note
34; Singer & Butler, supra note 32, at 132.
36. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 3 1, at 31-35; Lynch & Stein, Perspectives on Parent
Participation in Special Education, 3 Exceptional Educ. Q. 56, 61 (Aug. 1982); Singer &




they often have won special services for their children. Such out-
comes, though, have been the exception. Too few parents have
been sufficiently assertive in IEP meetings to overcome officials'
preference for program planning and against individualized
planning.
37
To assert their due process rights, parents must be aware that
these rights exist. They must also be able to make arguments per-
suasively, invest the time and effort necessary to present their case,
and be willing to risk future antagonism from school officials. 38 Few
have been able to meet all these criteria. Studies show that appeals
have been made on behalf of less than 1% of children receiving spe-
cial education services. Well-to-do parents have appealed more fre-
quently and therefore have gained the greatest benefits from the
right to appeal. 39 Even when parents have won, school districts
have sometimes continued to resist and to delay the implementation
of IEPs ordered in hearings. 40 Finally, school districts have gener-
ally limited the effects of hearing decisions to the particular ap-
pealed case. 4' Thus, the appeal process has not led to system-wide
improvements for handicapped children.
The reforms brought about by EAHCA also have had some nega-
tive side effects. The costs of IEP meetings and hearings, as well as
funding for expensive programs sometimes ordered in those hear-
ings, have diverted resources from special education and regular ed-
ucation programs. In some cases the reforms have curtailed the
ability of school districts to serve their handicapped and non-handi-
capped populations. Educators also have been overburdened by
paperwork requirements, especially in the first few years of
implementation.
4 2
37. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31; R. Weatherley, supra note 6.
38. J. Handler, The Conditions of Discretion: Autonomy, Community, Bureaucracy
(1986); Neal & Kirp, supra note 29.
39. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31, at 36; Kirst & Bertken, Due Process Hearings in
Special Education: Some Early Findings from California, in Special Education Policies:
Their History, Implementation, and Finance 136, 140-42 U. Chambers & W. Hartman
eds. 1983).
40. M. Budoff, A. Orenstein & C. Kervick, Due Process in Special Education: On
Going to a Hearing (1982), cited in Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31, at 33; Clune & Van
Pelt, supra note 31; Margolis & Truesdell, Do Special Education Teachers Use IEPs to
Guide Instruction?, 19 Urb. Rev. 151 (1987).
41. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 31, at 37; P. Kuriloff, D. Kirp & W. Buss, When
Handicapped Children Go to Court: Assessing the Impact of the Legal Reform of Spe-
cial Education in Pennsylvania 243-45 (1979).
42. Bartlett, supra note 20; Girardi, Grohe, Benedict & Coolidge, IEP-More Paper
Work and Wasted Time, 56 Contemp. Educ. 39 (Fall 1984); Stark, Tragic Choices in
Special Education: The Effect of Scarce Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No.
94-142, 14 Conn. L. Rev. 477 (1982).
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Not all school districts have fallen prey to these problems. Some
have made positive efforts to include parents in special-education
decision making; a noteworthy example has been the program in
Madison, Wisconsin, which provides advocates on request to assist
parents. 43 Such laudable initiatives, however, merely illustrate the
commitment of some officials to special education. They do not
prove that an educational system emphasizing parental rights can
function when officials are uncooperative.
The continued belief of most educators in the collective welfare
approach to education has generally frustrated the development of
parental accountability in special education. Officials have viewed
their responsibilities in broad, programmatic terms. They have
tried to bring parental wishes into line with their programs as a
whole, resisting implementation of individualized procedures. The
vague requirement of "appropriate education" and the low level of
participation among parents have enabled officials to limit the im-
pact of successful appeals to a few cases. Most districts have been
able to deflect parental accountability, responding to particular par-
ents' demands only when forced to and seeing those demands as
aberrations rather than mandates for system-wide change.
B. Parental Rights of School Choice in the United Kingdom
Granting parents the right of school choice in the United King-
dom illustrates how parental rights can change the pattern of deci-
sions and actions in particular cases. The British experience,
however, also demonstrates that strategies of parental accountabil-
ity are limited by the primarily collective welfare orientations of edu-
cation officials and that parental rights can impair officials' efforts to
offer educational opportunities to all children in their area.
Parents' wishes that children attend a particular school can con-
flict with education officials' abilities to manage the number of chil-
dren attending each school. Parents often prefer a particular school
because it is closer to home, maintains better discipline, or offers a
better education for their child. 44 Education officials, however, gen-
erally see admissions as a managerial task, and are not concerned
43. J. Handler, supra note 38. See also Singer & Butler, supra note 31, at 141.
44. Several surveys have been conducted to determine parents' reasons for request-
ing a particular school. See M. Adler, A. Petch &J. Tweedie, Parental Choice and Educa-
tion Policy (1989) [hereinafter M. Adler]; A. Macbeth, D. Strachan & C. Macaulay,
Parental Choice of School in Scotland (1986) [hereinafter A. Macbeth]; A. Stillman & K.




with which schools particular children attend. They often set admis-
sion limits for schools, so that no school is overcrowded or enrolls
so few children that it cannot offer economically a full range of
courses.
4 5
Until 1982, Britain dealt with this potential conflict by giving local
education officials in England, Wales, and Scotland broad discretion
to establish school admission policies and to make admission deci-
sions about particular children. Officials had to take account of par-
ents' wishes about which school their child attended, but were free
to override those wishes to prevent overcrowding or under-
enrollment.46
Government supporters of parental choice wanted to strengthen
the parental role in school admissions. Borrowing from the struc-
ture of clients' rights in welfare programs, the government estab-
lished statutory standards to govern education officials' decisions
and instituted local appeals so that parents could challenge deci-
sions. Advocates for parental choice of school argued that parents
are the best judges of what education most suits their child. With
the right to send a child to any school, parents could ensure that
their child received appropriate education and that schools would
respond to their concerns about education and school quality.
4 7
The Education Act 1980 (for England and Wales) and the Educa-
tion (Scotland) Act 1981 gave parents three important rights in
school admissions. First, parents have a right to request a particular
school for their child. Second, the child must be admitted to the
school unless a statutory ground of refusal exists. In England and
Wales, officials could refuse the request if granting it would cause
''prejudice [to] the provision of efficient education or the efficient
use of resources."-48 In Scotland, the primary ground of refusal was
stated more restrictively; schools could refuse parents' requests only
if granting them was "likely to be seriously detrimental to order and
discipline at the school or the educational well-being of the pupils
45. E. Briault & F. Smith, Falling Rolls in Secondary Schools (1980) (in 2 pts.); 1.
MacFadyen & F. McMillan, The Management of Change at a Time of Falling School
Rolls (1984).
46. Watt v. Kesteven County Council, I QB. 408 (1955); Education Act 1944 (Eng-
land), 7 & 8 Geo. 6, ch. 31, § 76; Education (Scotland) Act 1962, ch. 7, §§ 29, 37-40. See
also Bull, School Admissions: A New Appeals Procedure, 1980J. Soc. Welfare L. 209;
Meredith, Executive Discretion and Choice of Secondary School, 1981 Public Law 52.
47. M. Adler, supra note 44, at ch. 2; A. Maynard, Experiment with Choice in Educa-
tion (1975); E. Midwinter, Education Choice Thoughts (1980); Sexton, supra note 5.
48. Education Act 1980, ch. 20, § 6 (3)(a). Those provisions of the 1980 Act have
now been superseded by the Education Reform Act 1988, c. 40. The 1988 Act severely
restricts the powers of education authorities to refuse parents' school requests.
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there" or would require the hiring of new teachers or significant
extensions or alterations to the school. 49 The Scottish legislation
limited justifications for refusing parents' school requests to condi-
tions at the requested school. The more vague standard in the Eng-
lish and Welsh legislation allowed education authorities to use a
much broader range of concerns to justify refusals, including condi-
tions at other schools or in the authority generally. Third, when offi-
cials refused a parent's request, parents could appeal to a local
appeal committee. In Scotland, parents had a further appeal to the
sheriff (the lowest trial court judge).
50
In Scotland, parental rights changed school admissions dramati-
cally, depriving education officials of most of their power to refuse
parents' school requests. Before the establishment of parental
rights of school choice in Scotland, officials in all 12 education au-
thorities (essentially, school districts) assigned children to the
schools serving their residential area, and most of them refused
many parents' requests. Two of the largest authorities operated
"district school" policies that allowed parents' requests for alterna-
tive schools only when special circumstances existed. 5' Several hun-
dred requests were refused each year in at least two authorities, and
several other authorities refused lesser numbers.
52
After the implementation of the 1981 Act, virtually all parents'
school requests were granted in Scotland (64,370 of 66,534 from
1982 through 1985-96.7%). . 3 Except in a few cases involving rea-
sons specific to the child, such as disciplinary problems, officials did
not refuse requests unless the school's rolls had reached physical
capacity.
49. Education (Scotland) Act .1981, ch. 58, § 28A(3)(a). The authorities have used
the "seriously detrimental" clause in combination with the other two exceptions to ap-
ply to refusals based on their concerns about pupil numbers at the requested school.
Other grounds of refusal are specified in the English and Scottish acts, but only those
discussed above are relevant to overcrowding and under-enrollment in schools.
50. Education Act 1980, ch. 20, § 7; Education (Scotland) Act 1981, ch. 58, §§ 28D-
28F. See also Bull, supra note 46; Meredith, supra note 46; Tweedie, Rights in Social
Programmes: The Case of Parental Choice of School, 1986 Public Law 407, 411-12.
51. The description of education authorities' policies is based on interviews with of-
ficials in four authorities and an examination of all authorities' submissions to the Con-
vention of Scottish Local Authorities during consideration of parental choice legislation.
See Tweedie, The Dilemma of Clients' Rights in Social Programs, 23 L. & Soc'y Rev. 175
(1989).
52. G. Atherton, Reaching Out to Parents (Scottish Consumer Council, 1979); Ham-
mer to Crack a Nut, Times Educ. Supp. Scotland, Mar. 7, 1980, at 2.
53. Scottish Educ. Dep't, Statistical Bulletin No. 9 (Dec. 1983); Scottish Educ. Dep't,





As a result, schools in several authorities reached their maximum
levels of enrollment, necessitating continued use of temporary
buildings and annexes some distance from the main school site de-
spite the availability of places at nearby schools. More importantly,
some schools became seriously under-enrolled. During the 1980s,
school rolls in Scotland dropped by about one-third. Authorities
wanted to use admission limits set below the capacity of popular
schools to maintain sufficient numbers of pupils in less popular
schools. They could not do so, however, because the statutory
grounds of refusal referred only to conditions at the school re-
quested by the parent and to circumstances involving the particular
child. Enrollment losses attributable to parents' requests occurred
mostly in secondary schools in disadvantaged, working-class areas.
Reductions in the allotment of resources and course offerings at
these schools increased their disparities with schools that gained
pupils as a result of parents' requests.
54
In England and Wales, the effect of parental rights was different.
Less restrictive statutory language resulted in much less change in
school enrollments. Officials in many authorities continued to use
admission limits to protect under-enrolled schools. At least 40 of
the 104 English and Welsh education authorities set these limits be-
low their schools' physical capacities to maintain adequate enroll-
ment at all their schools. 55 At the same time, at least five authorities
did not use admission limits in this way. They allowed parents'
choices to fill popular schools to physical capacity even though less
popular schools might be hurt by under-enrollment. 51
The appeals procedures established in the 1980 and 1981 Acts
resulted in the reversal of some refusals, but appeals did not inter-
fere much with officials' efforts to protect under-enrolled schools.
Appeal committees seldom questioned the schools' admission lim-
its. Instead, they granted only a few appeals as exceptions to the
54. M. Adler, supra note 44, at ch. 7; Adler & Raab, Exit, Choice, and Loyalty: The
Impact of Parental Choice on Admissions to Secondary Schools in Edinburgh and Dun-
dee, 3J. Educ. Pol'y 155, 176-77 (1988).
55. This count of education authorities is based on a secondary analysis of education
authorities' responses to the Stillman and Maychell study, A. Stillman & K. Maychell,
supra note 44, and an examination of the Commissioners for Local Administration re-
ports of investigations involving school admission complaints. See Tweedie, supra note
51. It was not possible to determine whether the remaining 66 authorities used admis-
sion limits set below their schools' physical capacities.
56. All five of these authorities strongly encouraged parental choice prior to the
1980 Act, so it is not clear that the 1980 Act influenced the authorities' rejection of
admission limits set below schools' physical capacities. For a discussion of how the con-
tent of parents' rights in Scotland and in England and Wales influenced their effective-
ness, see Tweedie, supra note 51.
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limits. Many education authorities planned for anticipated appeals
by leaving a few places open for the committees to fill.
5 7
Parental rights of school choice in Scotland did not appear to in-
crease school officials' accountability to parents. First, relatively few
parents requested alternative schools: only 3.1% at the primary-
school level and 2.3% at the secondary-school level. The majority
of these requests occurred at entry to primary school and transition
to secondary school. 58 While the low number of requests suggests
that parental choice has had a limited effect on officials, it is neces-
sary to examine the reasons for parents' school requests and the way
officials have responded to them to see how parental rights affected
educators' accountability.
Parents had many different reasons for staying at or rejecting
their district school and for choosing an alternative school. While
many parents chose schools based on the quality of staff or facilities,
most focused on features of the school outside the control of school
officials and therefore outside the scope of accountability. At the
primary school level, most parents emphasized the proximity of the
school, convenience of travel to it, and the attendance of the child's
siblings or friends at the school. At the secondary school level, par-
ents cited similar reasons, although many also noted the lack of dis-
cipline at the school or poor examination results. - 9 Problems with
discipline or academic achievement can and should be the responsi-
bility of school officials, but even here a school's level of "success" is
often primarily a matter of the kinds of pupils who reside in the
school's district. Schools cited for poor examination results and dis-
cipline problems were invariably located in economically and so-
cially disadvantaged areas. Indeed, at least one survey of parents
found that parents often explicitly chose schools on the basis of the
kinds of children who attended them.(io
Surveys of parental school choice raise serious doubts about
whether a school's popularity reflects parental views of its quality.
While some schools are requested or rejected because of qualities
partially attributable to school officials (such as discipline), the over-
all pattern of requests is strongly influenced by factors unrelated to
school quality or officials' actions. Given the important influence of
57. M. Adler, supra note 44, at ch. 5; Buck, School Admission Appeals, 1985J. Soc.
Welfare L. 227; Bull, Monitoring Education Appeals: Local Ombudsmen Lead the Way,
1985.J. Soc. Welfare L. 189; Tweedie, supra note 50.
58. M. Adler, supra note 44; Scottish Educ. Dep't, supra note 53 (all cited sources).





location and siblings and friends who attend the school on parents'
requests, it seems problematic to reward and penalize schools on
the basis of their popularity. 6 1 Thus, while a case can be made for
allowing parents access to those schools, it is more difficult to justify
rewarding them for their popularity. Schools with less advantaged
district populations would lose resources, increasing the disparity
between the schools and limiting the education available to children
remaining in the less popular schools.
Finally, parental choice has not promoted parental accountability
because education authorities have, for the most part, resisted let-
ting market signals of popularity and unpopularity influence their
education policy decisions. 62 Most school officials discount the value
of parents' school requests as signals of the quality of schools,
although many do admit that removal of children from the school by
a large number of parents or avoidance of the school in the first
place can indicate problems there. Officials have viewed such
problems as justifying special efforts at the troubled school, rather
than shifting resources from less to more popular schools. Thus,
many less popular schools have received extra money. Authorities
have emphasized equality of educational opportunity and discour-
aged diversity among schools. 63 They have provided additional re-
sources to popular schools to help them cope with the new students,
but these increases seldom matched the new expenses.
There is also little evidence that authorities have focused on
school popularity in deciding which schools to close in response to
falling rolls. School authorities appear to be most concerned with
the state of the schools' physical facilities and saving expenses,
sometimes closing older, more popular schools in favor of newer
ones and sometimes merging older, more popular schools with
61. While schools in well-to-do areas are more popular than others, the expectation
that advantaged parents would use their rights of choice more often and more effectively
than disadvantaged parents has been questioned in two of the three British surveys
examining parents' choice. See M. Adler, supra note 44, at ch. 4; A. Macbeth, supra note
44, at 302-3. But see A. Stillman & K. Maychell, supra note 44, at 80-83, 86-91 (finding a
significant positive correlation between parents' occupational status and educational
achievement and the likelihood parents would make a school request).
62. This argument reflects the nature of the 1981 Act, which gave parents rights of
school choice without requiring authorities to link resources with school enrollments.
Such an arrangement would increase authorities' responsiveness to school choices. Yet
as long as authorities maintain general responsibility for running their schools, most act
to limit parental accountability.
63. A. Stillman & K. Maychell, supra note 44, at 44-46.
413
Yale Law & Policy Review
newer ones at the new site.64 Lastly, authorities seldom examine
parents' reasons for rejecting or choosing a school to determine
how the school might be improved or what qualities parents particu-
larly value. School-level officials are almost never informed of par-
ents' comments about their schools. And school officials generally
refuse to take appeal committees' rationales into account in their
own admissions decision making.
65
In short, school officials in Britain maintain their collective wel-
fare orientation. Where possible, they refuse requests that conflict
with important authority concerns, though the strong form of pa-
rental rights in Scotland precludes refusal in most cases. The au-
thority then adopts policies and allocates resources in ways that
serve its collective concerns given the patterns of admission that re-
sult. It must deal with the constraints of parents' school requests
and the pattern of school admissions, which provide little informa-
tion about how schools in the authority should be run. School offi-
cials do not see themselves as accountable to parents' choices of
schools.
III. The Limits of Parental Accountability
Concerns about the quality of public education have prompted
calls for stronger accountability to parents. Advocates argue that
giving parents rights enables them to ensure both that their children
receive a good education suited to their needs and abilities and that
schools maintain quality and offer the most appropriate educational
programs. In particular cases, these rights enable parents to hold
schools accountable. Parents unhappy with their child's education
can move their child to a more satisfactory school or raise questions
about their handicapped child's education program, often overcom-
ing school officials' collective welfare orientations and forcing the
authorities to give greater consideration to their child's abilities and
needs.
Parental rights, however, have not created a system of parental ac-
countability in public education. In most cases, parental rights in
64. Adler & Bondi, Delegation and Community Participation: An Alternative Ap-
proach to the Problems Created by Falling Primary School Rolls, in Education and Soci-
ety: Studies in the Politics, Sociology, and Geography of Education 52 (L. Bondi & H.
Matthews eds. 1988); When Parent Power Comes Dear, The Economist, June 25, 1988,
at 56.




special education do not significantly change school officials' ap-
proaches to decision making. A few children get individualized con-
sideration and special programs; most are placed into existing
program slots as the result of routine decision making procedures.
Parental rights "work" only for the small number of children whose
parents participate assertively and knowledgeably in IEP meetings
and hearings. More parents use their rights of school choice, yet
few hold schools accountable for unsatisfactory educational prac-
tices or reward effective schools. Instead, most parents choose an
alternative school because it is easier to reach or the child's siblings
or friends attend it.
In addition, school officials resist parental accountability. Paren-
tal rights do not affect most case-level decisions. Officials simply
treat the pattern of decisions that results from parents' actions as a
constraint within their collective welfare orientations. They usually
accept that parental rights reduce their control over particular cases,
but refuse to incorporate the effects of rights into their decision
making generally. They refuse to adopt the standards that the hear-
ings process produces. And they do not allocate resources on the
basis of schools' popularity with parents. Indeed, less popular
schools often receive greater resources.
School officials perceive efforts to increase parental accountability
as reducing their control over schools and interfering with their re-
sponsibility to provide effective education efficiently to all children.
They continue to focus on achieving collective ends. They are most
concerned with hierarchical accountability, that is, responding to
political officials and higher-level bureaucratic officials.
Parental rights in special education and school choice illustrate
how parents who exercise their rights can affect the education avail-
able to other children. Schools have limited resources, and parental
rights restrict how officials can allocate these resources. Teachers
and other school officials must divert time from their other respon-
sibilities to prepare for and attend IEP meetings. Special services
for handicapped children can involve substantial additional ex-
pense. While these expenses might be justified in particular cases,
individualized procedures make it difficult to balance the benefits
received by the child against the costs borne by other children."" In
school choice, parents' school requests can result in some schools
66. Bartlett, supra note 20; Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Dis-
crimination Act of 1975, 89 Yale L.J. 27, 84-92 (1979).
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being severely under-enrolled. The education of children remain-
ing in those schools suffers because of reduced curriculum options,
reduced resources, and declining teacher and student morale.
Perhaps parental accountability has not gone far enough. How-
ever, efforts to strengthen it further would increase its costs. Estab-
lishing rights that would grant parents unrestricted choice of school
or complete control over a child's special education program would
limit the ability of school officials to serve public purposes. Parents'
concerns would take precedence, regardless of whether the parents
possessed adequate knowledge to judge, whether their decisions af-
fected other children, and whether the parents' concerns and values
matched those of the public. Some children might receive better
education, depending upon the wisdom of their parents' decisions.
Parents who did not act would leave their children subject to the
effects of other parents' decisions and the reduced capacity of
school officials to compensate for inequalities among schools.
Accountability in education thus must be seen as consisting of two
different, and sometimes competing, strands-hierarchical account-
ability to policy makers and parental accountability to the parents
responsible for their children. Schools operate with limited re-
sources and competing ends. School officials should be free to allo-
cate resources among these competing ends, and should be held
accountable for their decisions. In other words, the collective wel-
fare orientation is inherent in the structure of public school govern-
ance. Parental rights should not undermine that orientation or the
hierarchical accountability implicit in it.
IV The Role of Parental Accountability
Within the framework of the collective welfare orientation, paren-
tal accountability has an important role. Since parents have primary
responsibility for their children's education, their concerns should
be respected when possible. In addition, officials can make mistakes
in some cases, and reliance on bureaucratic procedures and stan-
dards may result in officials' overlooking important special circum-
stances in particular cases. 67 Parental rights enable parents to
monitor school officials' decisions and actions in particular cases.
Their focused perspective counters school officials' concerns with
the pattern of decisions and actions. Parents can correct officials'
mistakes or their having overlooked special circumstances.




Parental rights in special education and school choice illustrate
how parental accountability can play an important role in educa-
tional decisions. Experience with these rights also reveals the limits
of that role. Legislators should structure parental rights to avoid
unduly restricting schools' abilities to serve collective welfare con-
cerns. They should also recognize that parental rights alone are not
adequate to protect individual children from mistakes or abuses in
school officials' collective welfare orientations. 68
Effective parental rights require both substantive standards and
procedures for parents to challenge officials' decisions. The sub-
stantive standards should state both parents' specific entitlements
and what collective concerns might justify denying those entitle-
ments in a particular case. Using choice of school as an example,
legislation might entitle parents to have their child admitted to any
school in the district, subject to qualifications about how the pattern
of requests might affect the school district's ability to run its schools
efficiently and equitably. Drawing on the experience of education
authorities in Scotland, the legislation might authorize school dis-
tricts to set enrollment limits at each of their schools calculated to
ensure that no school becomes overcrowded or under-enrolled. 6i '
Procedures are also needed to ensure that school officials respect
the substantive standards contained in parents' rights. Parents
should be able to challenge decisions concerning their children on
any of three grounds: (1) that officials have interpreted incorrectly
the substantive standards contained in parental rights in the
schools' policies and rules; (2) that officials have erred in their appli-
cation of the school's policies in their child's case; and (3) that an
exception to the school's policies is warranted by their child's spe-
cial circumstances.0
68. In addition to parental rights, the protection of individual children's interests in
education requires some form of hierarchical accountability focused on individual cases.
Administrative review of individual cases can provide a check on case-level officials' dis-
cretion. Resource limitations prevent review of all or even most cases, but occasional
reviews of cases randomly chosen can reinforce the importance of looking hard at each
case rather than mechanically applying bureaucratic standards. Review must, however,
remain sensitive to the special circumstances that may justify exceptional treatment. See
E. Brodkin, supra note 6; Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process, 59 Cornell L.
Rev. 772 (1974).
69. This situation essentially exists in many English and Welsh education authorities
operating under the Education Act of 1980, with its more general grounds for refusing
parents' school requests. See Tweedie, supra note 51.
70. Discussion of the substantive standards and procedural safeguards necessary to
ensure effective rights is based on the argument presented in Tweedie, supra note 51.
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Parental rights that contain such substantive standards and proce-
dural safeguards provide parents with the opportunity to participate
in decisions about their children's education without undermining
schools' ability to provide efficient and equitable education. These
rights establish parental accountability for individual children, but
explicitly reject a system of parental accountability in favor of existing
forms of hierarchical accountability. Parental accountability would
thus be established within the constraints of the collective welfare
orientation.
Critics of hierarchical accountability in public education have
identified a number of problems in educational governance and
have proposed different forms of parental accountability as a sys-
tematic response to those problems. As parental rights in special
education and school choice reveal, however, parental rights do not
result in a system of parental accountability. Rights enabling indi-
vidual parents to have a greater say in their children's education can
correct errors and oversights in particular cases, but these rights
also can interfere with school officials' efforts to run an efficient and
equitable school system. Parental rights can play an important role
in public education, but that role should be subordinate to the gen-
eral responsibilities of school officials and their collective welfare
orientations toward those responsibilities.
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